Don't take our word for it.
Every claim on this page can be checked by a third party without asking us: live ledger lookups, bytecode compiled from published source and compared byte-for-byte with mainnet, source file hashes, and adversarial test results. Where something does not verify, we say so.
Scorecard
What is proven today
Transaction results are fetched live by /api/proof from public XRPL and Polygon nodes at page load, not stored by us.
1 · Live ledger verification
Every transaction, checked against the chain
For each hash, this site's API asks a public node for the transaction and reports the result code, ledger or block, and timestamp exactly as the node returns them.
| Claim | Network | Result from chain | Ledger / block | Time (UTC) | Explorer |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Querying XRPL and Polygon… | |||||
Live account state
Check it yourself
curl -s https://xrplcluster.com -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"method":"tx","params":[{"transaction":
"FCF6DC44CB20FB28D20EF837D26422A67880C31E0FDDE87C14CC5BED345E833B"}]}'Any rippled or Polygon RPC works. No UnyKorn infrastructure is involved.
2 · Source ↔ bytecode
Does the deployed code match the published code?
We compiled the published Solidity with solc 0.8.24 (optimizer on, 200 runs), the same settings as our deployment scripts, and compared the runtime bytecode with what eth_getCode returns on Polygon.
| Contract | Address | On-chain | Compiled | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ProofOfFundsOracle | 0x39B7…fAA24 | 2,143 B | 2,143 B | EXACT MATCH including metadata hash |
| AeternaSovereignDollar | 0xA0B7…80481 | 8,535 B | 9,347 B | NO MATCH source was revised after deployment; deployed revision not yet published |
| RWA custodial vault | 0xC0f7…86AFdD | 3,592 B | — | NOT PUBLISHED source not in this repository |
Reproduce: solc --optimize --optimize-runs 200 --bin-runtime ProofOfFundsOracle.sol and diff against eth_getCode. Checked 17 Sep 2026.
Published source hashes
| File | Bytes | SHA-256 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| AeternaSovereignDollar.sol | 12,207 | 23cd33e25e816eabac90ee08093784698a17ab63f5c8e4a7b73137e9f3928659 | unchanged since 17 Sep 2026 |
| GenesisMintCertificateNFT.sol | 4,616 | b9190c48c860e5388d3b36ccf45380e56c1367e75bc49d4adf4d4d5c1d6e198e | unchanged since 17 Sep 2026 |
| HolyGrailStablecoin.sol | 15,212 | e4c2da79d406089d97da1343291ad7ed59838c92f51ddbb79fd3f3c67113e705 | revised 10 Nov 2026 |
| InstitutionalSettlementDollar.sol | 13,770 | fbcb09a0dce8e8e60cb260321a3d16685fc689e905515fa79386a32489e08ce0 | revised 10 Nov 2026 |
| ProofOfFundsOracle.sol | 4,063 | af86a15be1bb43b961ce3e963201749f491f36f37b9f7885c777bc3b4832fda0 | unchanged since 17 Sep 2026 |
| ProxyAdmin.sol | 1,458 | bb2f0d62dfe6687e043918eeaacd1d4bb311c4cb20cbcccc7c1c3c61a4f35f0e | unchanged since 17 Sep 2026 |
| QuantumShieldedDollar.sol | 22,214 | 9773bf35efb2641b314661dc4bdd9a22070445be568cb9107b811b0a118f0328 | revised 10 Nov 2026 |
| ReserveAttestationOracle.sol | 8,637 | 23b278a37e2cb68e40b65f57b8f0feec79f65135a745c9d57e9e63dd46acec9f | unchanged since 17 Sep 2026 |
| TransparentUpgradeableProxy.sol | 3,317 | 9ab08822ce59213d91fab556209e51cea4994902ee9d7f27dbfd302c5d687338 | unchanged since 17 Sep 2026 |
| archive/HolyGrailStablecoin.v1-2026-09-17.sol | 9,683 | 4d104be49d49f684b5a4451b392d24337413c0267824e1dee843c324c65a79fb | original, as published 17 Sep 2026 |
| archive/InstitutionalSettlementDollar.v1-2026-09-17.sol | 11,444 | 8608cd2e8c3063a281eeb758c040d5d2980ef73479da08a29e6e1a1a8cd8cc7b | original, as published 17 Sep 2026 |
| archive/QuantumShieldedDollar.v1-2026-09-17.sol | 11,294 | 4a816dae76c7a195f101625eaf3745c3cec79b87cb44df80f80a0db7bb0382e2 | original, as published 17 Sep 2026 |
| tests/QuantumShieldedDollar.t.sol | 20,740 | 841dbe323084489f1c042e6649394521d4b6e03202db85f88597ee8b0ff4bb91 | Foundry test, 10 Nov 2026 |
| tests/QuantumShieldedDollarV1Exploits.t.sol | 2,212 | 63898ae7bc06657d6f52a5cf02d4228514e02c71cfa34634466cfbfba2391dc8 | Foundry test, 10 Nov 2026 |
| tests/RolesAndQuotas.t.sol | 8,487 | f6d1c172a9408e2397beea78c0700f7e0a21084f3f71d64fdf6c43fa18775597 | Foundry test, 10 Nov 2026 |
Download any file and run sha256sum. The hash must match. Three reference contracts were revised on 10 Nov 2026 after an external review found security defects; the originals stay published under /contracts/archive/ with the hashes we first published, so earlier records still verify.
3 · Adversarial testing
Attack tests: 47 published, 14 self-reported
ReserveAttestationOracle and InstitutionalSettlementDollar are compiled with solc 0.8.24, deployed to an in-memory Ganache EVM, and attacked through ethers v6. These are real bytecode executions, not mocks.
Suite: test/adversarial_institutional_test.js · run 17 Sep 2026 against the original sources · Node 24 · exit code 0. This suite file is not yet published, so these 14 results are self-reported until it is.
Published and reproducible (10 Nov 2026): 47 Foundry tests that exercise the failure paths of the revised contracts, plus 4 that reproduce the original attacks succeeding against the archived sources. They cover: no single key can grant itself a mint quota, and replacing the master minter takes a 48-hour public timelock; every role can be rotated; a post-quantum-protected account cannot be moved, burned or redirected with a stolen ECDSA key, a pre-image seen in the mempool, or the pre-image alone; emergency recovery cannot be front-run and resets every role; implementations cannot be initialised outside the proxy. Each finding from our internal failure-path reviews has a test in these files. These are our tests, not an audit. Run instructions: README.txt.
Also disclosed: a second runner (evm_genuine_test_runner.js) currently fails because it references a contract not in the repository. A third file performs static source-pattern checks only and is not presented as an audit. No independent third-party audit has been performed yet; the published tests are ours, not an audit.
- PASS 01 · Mint rejected with no active attestation
- PASS 02 · Valid mint of $50 within reserve headroom
- PASS 03 · Mint rejected when it would breach the 5% risk buffer
- PASS 04 · Mint rejected to a frozen recipient
- PASS 05 · Mint rejected on stale attestation (+13h)
- PASS 06 · Emergency pause blocks minting
- PASS 07 · Two-step ownership: attacker rejected, handover succeeds
- PASS 08 · Revoked minter cannot mint
- PASS 09 · Compliance role reassigned and exercised
- PASS 10 · Duplicate attestor signature rejected
- PASS 11 · Forged / unauthorized attestor signature rejected
- PASS 12 · Single signature rejected under 2-of-2 threshold
- PASS 13 · Validity window over 24h hard limit rejected
- PASS 14 · Valid sorted 2-of-2 attestation committed
4 · Plain-language status
What these proofs do and don't show
Proven
- UnyKorn controls a configured XRPL mainnet issuer and has issued, delivered and recorded tokens on it.
- UnyKorn deployed working contracts to Polygon mainnet, including an oracle whose code exactly matches published source.
- The reserve-gated minting design rejects unbacked, stale, forged and frozen-recipient mints in real EVM execution.
- End-to-end tooling exists across XRPL, EVM, attestation, ISO 20022 and HTTP 402.
Not claimed
- Pilot tokens (AET, AET-USD) are not a regulated stablecoin and have no redemption right. Only the first 10 units were cash-backed.
- No external audit, accountant attestation, or regulatory licence yet.
- Collateral valuations in internal test records are not independently verified and are not presented as assets.
- The deployed AET-USD bytecode does not match current source (see above).